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Introduction 
I have been involved in law enforcement on college campuses for over 
twenty-two years, even serving as a police officer during my own college 
experience at the University of Iowa.  It was during my time at Iowa that I 
experienced my first campus shooting. 
On November 1, 1991, there was an active shooter on Iowa’s campus.1  
The shooter killed six people, and I was the first responding officer.2  Being 
a first responder is an experience that has stuck with me.  Expertise comes 
from shared experiences and observations.  I am not an expert, but I have 
                                                                                                                 
 † Transcript of presentation given on Friday, November 6, 2009, at the Violence on 
Campus Symposium, held by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice. 
 * Chief of Police, The College of William and Mary; Graduate, 2010, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation National Academy; M.S. in Criminal Justice, 2001, St. Ambrose 
University; B.A. in History, 1993, The University of Iowa.  I would like to thank Mike 
Young, Director of Public Safety at Washington and Lee University and Anna Martin, Vice 
President for Administration at The College of William and Mary, for their support. 
 1.  See Steven Lee Myers, Student Opens Fire at U. of Iowa, Killing 4 Before 
Shooting Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1991, at 18 (reporting a shooting at the University of 
Iowa which occurred on November 1, 1991). 
 2. See id. ("A distraught graduate student went on a shooting rampage in two 
buildings on the University of Iowa campus in Iowa City yesterday, killing four people and 
critically wounding two others before fatally shooting himself in the head."). 
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been around long enough to develop some of my own thoughts on the 
subject. 
When I was asked to present today it was to talk about the appropriate 
response for law enforcement or security.  I was having a great deal of 
difficulty until I realized that I had made a mistake—there is no single, 
appropriate response to a major incident.  Emergency response is discussed 
as if there is a single course of action, universal to all situations and 
locations.3  The environments in which we work are dynamic, as are the 
potential hazards we face.4  There is no response suitable for all of these 
different possibilities.5  Instead, a framework and procedure should be in 
place that takes into consideration national standards and the abilities of the 
responders, yet is sufficiently flexible to address the specific needs of the 
threat.6 
The desire to have a universal response creates expectations that are 
unrealistic and rarely attainable.7  The best example of unrealistic 
expectations is the notion of a campus lockdown.8 Lockdowns are all we 
hear about as practitioners.  While lockdowns may work for a few small 
campuses, the idea of a campus-wide lockdown has been the default 
response of nonpractitioners.9  Yet, in most cases a lockdown cannot be 
accomplished.10  Response is a collective and comprehensive approach to 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER:  A THREAT ASSESSMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (1999) ("In a knee-jerk reaction, communities may resort to inflexible, one-
size-fits-all policies on preventing or reacting to violence."). 
 4. See id. at 5 (explaining that all threats are different and present unique challenges 
requiring different approaches). 
 5. See id. ("[S]chools must recognize that every threat does not represent the same 
danger or require the same level of response."). 
 6. See id. (advocating a nationwide, systematic approach to threat assessment so that 
every school has a comprehensive violence-prevention plan). 
 7. See id. (explaining that because all threats are unique, one approach to violence 
prevention is not sufficient). 
 8. See JOHN NICOLETTI ET AL., VIOLENCE GOES TO COLLEGE:  THE AUTHORITATIVE 
GUIDE TO PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 238 (2009) (noting that the Virginia Tech campus 
did not shut down or initiate a lockdown during the shooting on campus in 2007). 
 9. See John Cloud, What Can the Schools Do?, TIME, May 3, 1999, at 6 ("[T]hey 
[frightened school employees] want lock-downs and detector dogs and strapped rent-a-cops 
to be a regular feature of school life."). 
 10. See Brett A. Sokolow et al., College and University Liability for Violent Campus 
Attacks, 34 J.C. & U.L. 319, 332 (2008) (questioning the ability of large universities to 
effectively lock down campuses). 
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disaster management and is as much about anticipation, prevention, 
mitigation, and training as it is about the actual, physical response.11   
In the first Part of this discussion I will broadly examine campus 
security responses.  Then, in the second Part of this discussion I will 
specifically consider the topic of shooters on campus, suicides, and similar 
types of threats. 
I.  A General Framework for Responding to On-Campus Threats 
A comprehensive framework for responding to on-campus threats 
requires us to broaden our concept of response through three different but 
related activities.  First is the anticipation of, and planning for, a variety of 
potential hazards and incidents.12  Second is the actual response to the 
incident.13  Third is the response to the actions of the responders—in other 
words, the response to the response.  Let us look at each of these activities, 
individually. 
There are two types of potential hazards and threats.  Some threats are 
general, affecting large areas, such as severe weather, pandemics, or 
infectious disease outbreaks.14  General threats typically require a campus 
or community-wide response over a period of time.15  The other types of 
threats are more site-specific, such as a fire or an active shooter.16  Site-
specific threats are typically much shorter in duration and have an 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See SCOTT NEWGASS & DAVID J. SCHONFELD, CRISIS INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 
505 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 3d ed. 2005) (creating a plan to respond to disasters on campus 
beginning with mental health providers and faculty members anticipating and preventing 
disasters and then incorporating emergency response teams that respond to the actual 
occurrence of a disaster). 
 12. See O’TOOLE, supra note 3, at 26 (recommending that schools create 
multidisciplinary teams prepared to deal with various types of threats at various levels). 
 13. See id. at 28 (explaining that response to a threat must meet the level of the threat, 
involving law enforcement officers as necessary). 
 14. See Eugene L. Zdziarski et al., The Crisis Matrix, in CAMPUS CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PLANNING, PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND 
RECOVERY 35, 39 (Eugene L. Zdziarski ed., 2007) ("[S]ome crisis events have a major 
impact well beyond the border of the campus.  Perhaps the most obvious example is 
Hurricane Katrina."). 
 15. See id. (explaining that certain types of disasters affect the larger community as 
well as the campus, so resources must be shared, thus delaying the recovery process). 
 16. See id. at 38 ("A campus emergency is defined as an event that disrupts the orderly 
operations of the institution."). 
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identifiable start and end.17  The management of both types of incidents 
requires planning.18 
A.  Comprehensive Planning 
Disaster planning must be a comprehensive activity, which operates 
from an all-hazards perspective, looking at all possible threats regardless of 
their likelihood.19  What is something that never happens here in this part of 
the country, or is very unlikely?  A plane crashing here in the middle of 
campus is unlikely, so you would not plan for that.20  Planning requires 
looking at the whole range of things that may happen and have happened 
and working from there.21  Focusing on an active shooter event is common 
because of its dramatic impact, even though a college is more likely to 
experience a fire or a weather incident.22  Whether or not an emergency is 
general or specific, there should be an understanding of emergency 
response protocols, and the protocols should be consistent with national 
response guidelines.23 
 All response guidelines should follow the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS)24 or Instant Command Systems (ICS).25  All 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See id. (expounding that specific emergencies can require the campus to shut down 
for a defined period of time). 
 18. See id. at 47 ("The institution must give deliberate thought to crisis management 
planning."). 
 19. See Maureen E. Wilson, Crisis Training, in CAMPUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PLANNING, PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 183, 184 
(Eugene L. Zdziarski ed., 2007) (explaining that because a crisis cannot always be predicted, 
it is necessary to plan the most important elements of general responses that can apply to any 
situation). 
 20. See Zdziarski et al., supra note 14, at 48 (noting that it is most effective to evaluate 
which emergency situations are probable and plan accordingly for the most likely scenarios). 
 21. See id. ("Knowing the types of incidents a campus is likely to experience, such as 
large-scale events, weather incidents, and the possibility of exterior threats . . . can provide 
opportunities to avoid serious incidents from happening or at least mitigate their impact."). 
 22. See MELISSA ALLEN HEATH, SCHOOL-BASED CRISIS INTERVENTION 3 (2005) 
("Although dramatic events covered by the media such as school shooting, bomb threats, and 
natural disasters garner the bulk of public attention, providing secondary intervention for a 
wide variety . . . [of] needs is of paramount importance."). 
 23. See Zdziarski et al., supra note 14, at 47 (explaining that a plan for crisis response 
must be made in advance of the incident and that training should be done to assure that the 
plan is understood by all staff and resources); see also, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF 
SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., EARLY WARNING, TIMELY RESPONSE:  A GUIDE TO SAFE 
SCHOOLS 23 (1998) ("The plan must be consistent with federal, state, and local laws."). 
 24. See Anice I. Anderson et al., Managing in a Dangerous World:  The National 
APPROPRIATE RESPONSES OF CAMPUS SECURITY FORCES 173 
responders and administrators should have a working knowledge of NIMS 
and ICS protocols.26  Once this framework and its applications are 
understood and implemented, the basis for response to all situations is 
established.27  Preparing for one specific event, whether it is a fire or 
something else, means that you are prepared, potentially, to respond to 
anything, because the structure is in place:  who is in charge, who reports 
where, who is responsible for what.28 
B.  Establishing a Hierarchy of Responsibility 
For many years there has been confusion on college campuses about 
who is in charge during a disaster.29  I want to clarify:  any incident that 
requires a tactical response by police or fire is under the control of the 
appropriate fire or police on-scene incident commander.30  Civilians, 
regardless of their status at the institution, cannot and should not direct the 
actions of police or fire personnel.31  For practitioners, such as myself, this 
                                                                                                                 
Incident Management System, 16 ENGINEERING MGMT. J. 3, 4 (2004) ("NIMS is the first 
standardized management approach that unifies Federal, state, and local lines of government 
for incident response."). 
 25. See id. at 4 ("NIMS establishes ICS as a standard incident management 
organization with five functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics, and 
finance/administration—for management of all major incidents."). 
 26. See Norbert W. Dunkel & Linda J. Stump, Working with Emergency Agency 
Personnel and Outside Agencies, in CAMPUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO PLANNING, PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 121, 127 (Eugene L. Zdziarski 
ed., 2007) (noting that preparedness requires training, education, and knowledge of codes for 
successful management of an incident). 
 27. See id. at 123 ("It [NIMS and ICS] gives responders an integrated organizational 
structure that meets the complexity of any incident or multiple incidents."). 
 28. See Zdziarski et al., supra note 14, at 48 (noting that during the planning phase it 
is important to establish who will respond to what and when they will respond). 
 29. See HEATH, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that unless crisis-management plans 
are previously coordinated and planned, assistance from outside sources can add to 
confusion); see also J. Michael Rollo & Eugene L. Zdziarski, Developing a Crisis 
Management Plan, in CAMPUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
PLANNING, PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 73, 74 (Eugene L. Zdziarski ed., 2007) 
(noting that creating a written plan on how to respond that includes specifics about who is in 
charge helps lessen confusion during an actual crisis). 
 30. See Grant P. Sherwood & David McKelfresh, Crisis Management Teams, in 
CAMPUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PLANNING, PREVENTION, 
RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 55, 65–66  (Eugene L. Zdziarski ed., 2007) ("[I]n any situation 
where outside emergency agencies (for example, the police or fire department) are involved, 
they will secure the situation and take jurisdiction of all activities."). 
 31. See id. at 66 (explaining that once the police or fire department arrives, the crisis 
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is a no-brainer:  we have had to draw a line in the sand saying "this is 
ours."32 
There are several reasons for this separation of responsibility.  
Responders are trained and equipped to address the incident, plan and 
practice their response, and act in accordance with national standards.33  
Responders understand the concept of the incident command and the tactics 
necessary to resolve the incident.34  Second, from a practical standpoint, 
most incidents that require police response or fire response would be 
handled long before administrators can be located, assembled, informed, 
and a judgment made.35  The fact that civilians do not direct the response or 
emergency personnel does not mean that they are unimportant to the 
management of the incident.36  The civilian role is key to disaster 
management.37  The response to the response is comprised of the actions 
taken by the institution in reaction to actions taken by responders.38  This is 
the best way I have found to explain to my administration the separation of 
authority and duties. 
Actions by response personnel are typically short in duration with a 
definable start and end, whereas the response to the response can last for 
                                                                                                                 
management team established by the institution must become supportive to the outside 
emergency agency). 
 32. See id. ("One assumption should be in writing:  in any situation where outside 
emergency agencies (for example, the police or fire department) are involved, they will 
secure the situation and take jurisdiction of all activities."). 
 33. See Norbert W. Dunkel & Linda J. Stump, Working with Emergency Agency 
Personnel and Outside Agencies, in CAMPUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO PLANNING, PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 121, 130–33 (Eugene L. 
Zdziarski ed., 2007) (noting that preparedness requires training, education, and knowledge 
of codes for successful management of an incident). 
 34. See id. at 132 (explaining that the police work with a commander or director in 
charge of the operation, who has worked with the school to create crisis-management plans 
and is trained to handle crisis situations). 
 35. See Kelly J. Asmussen & John W. Creswell, Campus Response to a Student 
Gunman, 66 J. HIGHER EDUC. 575, 577 (1995) (describing how campus police are the first to 
arrive at shooting situations and how campus administrations respond to events after police 
have handled the situation). 
 36. See Sherwood & McKelfresh, supra note 30, at 66 (explaining that although police 
and other emergency agencies must be in charge of handling situations, the institution’s 
administrators should stand for the institution as well as support the police). 
 37. See Sean K. Murphy, Crisis Management Demystified:  Here’s How to Prevent a 
Crisis from Ruining Your Institution’s Reputation, 6 U. BUS. 36, 37 (2003) (noting that, as 
part of a good crisis-management plan, administrators should address the event to the public, 
conduct a press conference, and organize the institution). 
 38. See id. (emphasizing that the key to crisis management is fast communication 
within and by the institution as the crisis is occurring and directly after the crisis). 
APPROPRIATE RESPONSES OF CAMPUS SECURITY FORCES 175 
weeks, days, months, and in some instances years.39  The response to the 
response defines the institution’s mitigation and public perception of the 
overall management of the incident.  There remain decisions that need to be 
made during and in the aftermath of the event.  These include, but are not 
limited to: 
• What information to give to the public or the media; 
• Do you close or reduce the operations of the institution; 
• What do you do with the affected members of the community; 
and 
• How to return to normal operations as quickly as possible?40 
The administration must also decide how to handle information from 
the first responders.41  That is the role of the administration.42  For example, 
fires, chemical spills, or gas leaks may last for a long period of time, 
requiring relocation of members of the community.43  The logistics of this 
scenario require planning and organization.44  This is the exact function of 
the administrators, and usually falls under the umbrella of the institution’s 
emergency-management team.45  We talked about NIMS and ICS.46  State 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Cynthia J. Lawson, Crisis Communication, in CAMPUS CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PLANNING, PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND 
RECOVERY 97, 116 (Eugene L. Zdziarski ed., 2007) (noting that in the recovery phase of 
crisis management long-term action must sometimes be taken). 
 40. See BRENDA PHILLIPS, DISASTER RECOVERY 242 (2009) (explaining that after a 
disaster, a university must question how much downtime is needed before normal operating 
conditions can be resumed); see also Scott Cowen, Tulane University:  From Recovery to 
Renewal, 93 LIBERAL EDUC. 6, 7 (2007) (noting that in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
Tulane University had to question how to deal with the displacement of almost the entire  
city of New Orleans); see also Murphy, supra note 37, at 7 (stating that institutions must 
question how and when to deal with the media after a crisis). 
 41. See Rollo & Zdziarski, supra note 29, at 88 (noting that the institution, in its crisis-
management plan, should decide how to work with first responders and how to communicate 
information received from first responders to the community and to the rest of the 
university). 
 42. See id. at 78–79 (explaining that the institution’s administration has the 
responsibility of creating a crisis-management plan and following that plan during a crisis). 
 43. See Cowen, supra note 40, at 6 (noting that Hurricane Katrina caused over eighty 
percent of the population of New Orleans to relocate and that Tulane University’s student 
body was evacuated to Houston, Texas, requiring the University to rebuild over a long 
period of time). 
 44. See John Lawson, A Look Back at a Disaster Plan:  What Went Wrong—and 
Right, 52 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 20, 21 (2005) (explaining the plan that Tulane 
University had in place prior to Hurricane Katrina for various hurricane levels, which 
included a detailed evacuation plan). 
 45. See Rollo & Zdziarski, supra note 29, at 73 (explaining that developing a crisis-
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institutions are required to follow NIMS and ICS, especially if the 
institution wants grant funding, or is expecting reimbursement for losses in 
a disaster.47  Private schools would also be well served to adopt ICS and 
NIMS processes in their disaster management plans. 
Responding to violence is inherently reactive to the situation, and at 
best can minimize casualties.48  The most recent example occurred 
yesterday at Fort Hood, Texas.49  Ft. Hood is a very secure place,50 with a 
lot of military personnel.  The soldiers are talented, armed, trained, and 
equipped to take-on a small country.51  That said, I have lost track—thirteen 
are dead, twenty-nine injured.52  Then we look at Columbine,53 and the 
response before and after.54  At Columbine, the response was:  shots are 
being fired; law enforcement shows up and waits until they have sufficient 
                                                                                                                 
management plan is the duty of campus administrators). 
 46. See Anderson et al., supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 47. See id. at 6 ("[F]unding recipients are required to utilize the new National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) for organizing any critical emergency responses to a terrorist 
attack, disaster, or other critical response requirement."). 
 48. See ALAN M. LEVITT, DISASTER PLANNING AND RECOVERY:  A GUIDE FOR FACILITY 
PROFESSIONALS 104 (1997) ("In the During Phase, the preplanned, tested, and practiced 
processes of countering the consequences and affects of the impact are put into use and 
action so that the number of casualties (both injuries and deaths) will be as few as 
possible."). 
 49. See Robert D. McFadden, 12 Killed, 31 Wounded in Rampage at Army Post; 
Officer Is Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at A1 ("An Army psychiatrist facing 
deployment to one of America’s war zones killed 12 people and wounded 31 others on 
Thursday in a shooting rampage with two handguns at the sprawling Fort Hood Army post 
in central Texas.").  The shooting at Fort Hood took place on November 5, 2009.  Id. 
 50. See id. ("Fort Hood . . . is the largest active duty military post in the United States, 
340 square miles of training and support facilities and homes, a virtual city for more than 
50,000 military personnel."). 
 51. See id. (stating that the Fort Hood base serves as a prime deployment point for 
conflicts overseas). 
 52. See id. (reporting that thirteen people were killed while thirty were injured, 
according to U.S. military officials). 
 53. See Gun Spree at Columbine High, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A22 (reporting 
that two students opened fire on unsuspecting students at the Littleton, Colorado, high 
school); see also Elliot Aronson, How the Columbine High School Tragedy Could Have 
Been Prevented, 60 J. INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOL. 355, 355 (2004) (describing how the Columbine 
tragedy, which resulted in the loss of a teacher and fourteen students, could have been 
prevented through interventionist techniques, such as group re-organization). 
 54. See Kenneth S. Trump, Columbine’s 10th Anniversary Finds Lessons 
Learned:  Substantial Strides Have Been Made in School Security, but Glaring Gaps 
Remain, DISTRICT ADMIN., Apr. 2009, at 26, 28 (2009) (discussing the overall security 
lessons learned from the Columbine incident). 
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numbers—such as SWAT reinforcements—while people are being killed.55  
We have learned from that.56  The operation orders are now the first person 
who gets there, if he does not have backup coming soon, locates and 
eliminates the threat.57  By sheer force of power or noise, responding 
officers want to eliminate the threat or apply such pressure that the shooter 
takes his or her own life.58  You will see this often with active shooters, at 
the first sign of pressure they will commit suicide.59  That has been the 
response to campuses by law enforcement:  Do not wait for backup, 
because while you are waiting, people are dying.60  The Virginia Tech 
response was a very good response by a very good department.61   But 
unfortunately, many casualties resulted.62 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Dirk Johnson, As They Mourn, They Are Left to Wonder, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
1999, at A24 (questioning whether law-enforcement agencies have effective policies for 
addressing crises similar to Columbine).  The article further remarks that local law officials 
arrived several hours after the assailants fired their first shots, waiting even longer before 
entering the building.  Id.  Police officials, however, justified their delay, suggesting that 
they believed the gunmen were still firing and, thus, did not intend on placing their 
personnel in danger.  Id. 
 56. See, e.g., MSU Emergency Management Information:  Violence Involving 
Firearms or Other Weapons, MICH. ST. U. POLICE, http://police.msu.edu/ 
resources/eminfo.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter MSU Emergency Management 
Information] (describing the implementation of the nationally-recognized "rapid-response" 
approach when someone is actively using a weapon); see also Trump, supra note 54, at 28 
(outlining several new school security measures adopted post-Columbine, including 
reducing school access, utilizing surveillance cameras, and enhancing communications). 
 57. See MSU Emergency Management Information, supra note 56 (permitting initial 
responders to destabilize the threat—at least until a tactical team arrives); see also Darcia 
Harris Browman, Police Adopt "Rapid Response" to Shootings, EDUC. WK., Apr. 4, 2001, at 
1, (reporting on the new "rapid response" approach adopted by local law officials, which 
requires first responders to address the situation before support arrives). 
 58. See David B. Kopel, Pretend "Gun-Free School Zones:  A Deadly Legal Fiction, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 515, 543–44 (2009) ("An attacker who is under fire will have much less 
freedom to aim his own shots carefully and kill his intended victims . . . .  [A]ctive shooters 
tend to crumble at the first sign of active resistance."); see also Timothy Harper, Shoot to 
Kill, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2000, at 28, 30 ("The contact team is supposed to pursue the 
gunmen, pressure them to keep moving, and prevent them taking over populated areas.").  
According to the article, "rapid response" advocates focus on one theme:  isolate the shooter 
and let him decide the outcome.  Id. 
 59. See Kopel, supra note 58, at 542 (quoting a police officer who intimated that 
active shooters, if pressed, are likely to kill themselves); Harper, supra note 58, at 30 
(discussing the inherent chaos involved in shooting scenes, which often results in the 
gunmen committing suicide). 
 60. See MSU Emergency Management Information, supra note 56 (adopting "rapid 
response" approach at Michigan State University campus). 
 61. See Gordon K. Davies, Connecting the Dots:  Lessons Learned from the Virginia 
Tech Shootings, CHANGE, Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 8, 13 (noting that the response of police and 
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C.  Identifying Threats 
There has to be more to keeping our communities safe than the ability 
to respond with force when needed.  While this is important, there may be 
no more important goal than having a process to identify those who have 
potential for harm to self or others.63  This returns us to planning prevention 
and mitigation activities and responses.  Nearly every investigation, and this 
goes back to my days at Iowa when there were flags there, shows that there 
was a history or series of flags or warnings indicating the potential for harm 
to self or others.  These behaviors clearly indicate an ongoing and 
progressing threat.  In most cases, people saw these flags but did not share 
the information.  There are a couple of reasons for this.  One, they did not 
recognize the flags and signals.  Two they did not want to get involved.  Or 
three because there was no formal mechanism to share the information.  In 
most instances when there has been a mechanism to identify and manage 
such cases, it has been an informal process.  While beneficial, these 
practices are not widespread and often contain gaps that make it hard to do 
full and complete assessments.  Or, if an assessment was undertaken that 
called for after-care management, the ongoing care or monitoring fell short.  
Tragic events on campuses have required colleges to formalize their 
processes, and I think most schools now either have or are developing 
threat-assessment teams. 
II.  Responding to Potential Threats Posed by At-Risk Students 
We must focus on three major areas:  recognizing threats, reporting 
concerns or complaints, and managing the person who is identified.  There 
is a lot of concern amongst faculty about privacy issues.  So if we are going 
to market this threat-assessment plan—and you have to—this process 
should be viewed as something that is done for someone, not to someone. 
Threat assessment is not a punitive but rather a restorative process, 
designed to identify concerning behaviors so that appropriate actions can be 
                                                                                                                 
other emergency-rescue squads was "generally excellent" at Virginia Tech during the 2007 
shooting).   
 62. See id. at 9 (reporting that Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Tech assailant, killed 
thirty-two people and himself). 
 63. See William N. Bender et al., Invisible Kids:  Preventing School Violence by 
Identifying Kids in Trouble, 37 INTERVENTION SCH. & CLINIC 105, 106–07 (2001) 
(acknowledging that the foremost question in preventing school shootings turns on whether 
troubled students can be identified). 
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undertaken.  It should be marketed as a community-wide effort to ensure 
the safety of the community, as the process is dependent on the 
involvement of all segments of the institution.64  The threat-assessment 
team will identify persons at risk through their own information or from 
concerns and complaints from the community.65  Based upon their 
investigation, the team will make a determination regarding the level of 
threat posed and the proper management of the individual.66  Low-order 
behaviors will be identified so that they can be addressed by campus and 
community resources.67  For those individuals who present a higher level of 
concern, the team will develop a management plan to lessen the potential 
harm to self or others.68  Communication, external and internal, is essential 
to the success of the threat-assessment team.69  This allows the team to 
make an accurate assessment.70  The information becomes cumulative:  if 
institutional personnel—including representatives from student health, 
student affairs, residence life, human resources, and faculty—have a high 
level or bar that must be cleared before they inform the threat-assessment 
team, many concerning behaviors may go undetected.71  The behavior takes 
place in isolation and is unactionable.  When independent concerns are 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See id. at 14–15 (arguing that successful discourse among community officials, 
including university and public-service personnel, effectively diminishes the likelihood of 
these tragedies). 
 65. See id. (proposing that "threat-assessment teams" are integral to preventing critical 
incidents akin to the Virginia Tech shooting). 
 66. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER:  A THREAT 
ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 27–30 (2000) [hereinafter THREAT ASSESSMENT], available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/school-shooter (setting forth guidelines on 
how to approach various threats, ranging from low to high, and subsequently determining 
how to address different threat levels).  Following the National Center for the Analysis of 
Violent Crime’s (NCAVC) symposium on school shootings, the FBI published a report that 
recommends the adoption of the threat assessment approach for academic institutions.  Id. at 
1–2.  The threat assessment approach is two-fold:  First, identify possible offenders.  Id. at 3.  
And second, intervene, so as to avoid potential violent conflicts.  Id. at 3. 
 67. See id. at 27–28 (suggesting that the threat-assessment coordinator should handle 
low-level threats through interviews and other measures. if necessary). 
 68. See id. (suggesting that, in the case of high-level threats, schools should contact 
local law enforcement and enact pre-designated response plans to address the immediacy of 
the situation). 
 69. See Davies, supra note 61, at 14 ("Institutions need to break through current 
barriers to communication to ensure that information about potential threats is shared by 
everyone who needs to know."). 
 70. See id. (suggesting that effective communication among community officials helps 
disable potential threats). 
 71. See id. (reaffirming the proposition that the academic personnel need to 
communicate amongst themselves to identify and stabilize such threats). 
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shared the cumulative information may elevate the risk such that the risk is 
actionable That is the essence of a threat assessment team:  you can take 
these things that are not otherwise on anybody’s radar and now take action 
on them.72  Past efforts to communicate have been hampered by 
misinterpretation of privacy laws.73  A more correct interpretation of 
existing privacy laws allows for the sharing of information.74  The safety 
needs of the community nearly always trump the privacy rights of the 
individual.75 
This next part of this threat-assessment plan is about marketing and 
getting people comfortable with the process.  It is important that the team 
understand that all concerns and complaints that come to its attention must 
be taken seriously, and that, at times, members of the community may come 
under the consideration of the team when little or no potential exists for 
further case management.76  With this understanding, the team is aware of 
its responsibility regarding the sensitivity and security of confidential 
information gathered during the assessment, and it has established policies 
and procedures for the assimilation, dissemination, and destruction of 
records or other information when no reasonable threat has been 
determined.77 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See id. (noting that threat-assessment teams overcome the inherent problem of 
"communicating on different frequencies" when threats are realized). 
 73. See Matthew Alex Ward, Reexamining Student Privacy Laws in Response to the 
Virginia Tech Tragedy, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 407, 412  ("Communication 
breakdowns at various stages prevented Virginia Tech educators from developing the full 
picture of Cho’s unhealthy behavior.").  This communication breakdown was further 
exasperated because Virginia Tech officials failed to understand the full picture of FERPA.  
Id. at 434. 
 74. See id. at 417–18 (suggesting that Virginia Tech personnel failed to take advantage 
of the "safety and health emergency" exception under FERPA, thereby permitting 
disclosure). 
 75. See Davies, supra note 61, at 15 (implying that privacy issues, such as those 
relating to health records, should be secondary to ensuring the overall safety of the 
community).  But cf. Ward, supra note 73, at 434–35 (suggesting a better 
approach:  amending, and therefore balancing, the requirements of FERPA with safety 
interests of the community). 
 76. See THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 66, at 27 (noting that low-level threats may 
require only interviews with the person-at-issue and nothing more, depending on school 
policy). 
 77. See Dewey Cornell, Threat Assessment in College Settings, CHANGE, Jan.–Feb. 
2010, at 8, 13 (maintaining that effective threat assessment approaches require "clear 
policies and procedures that establish the team’s authority and scope of action").  In campus 
settings, threat-assessment teams should maintain their own records and treat them with 
confidence—accessible only to the team.  Id. at 14. 
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It is important to identify what behaviors should be reported to the 
team.78  The challenge on a campus is separating the academic nuttiness 
from disruptive, destructive, and dangerous behaviors that can lead to 
extremely serious incidents.79  While we work to avert a tragedy, we will 
find numerous behaviors that are disruptive and destructive, perhaps not to 
the community, but surely to the individual, and over time, if unchecked, 
they may lead to further problems.80  Behaviors that affect the person’s 
ability to develop personally, socially, and academically, left unchecked, 
may eventually affect the community.81  The halo effect of the process is 
the identification of these behaviors.82  There are many resources on college 
campuses.  The key is to get people in need of service into the funnel.83  
This process may identify actions that are not criminal and may not become 
criminal, but are holding this person back from being productive, thriving, 
striving, and moving forward.84  This is the mechanism that provides access 
and entry to appropriate resources while problems are small and more 
manageable.85 
We do not profile.  We look at behavioral changes over time.  I wish 
my friend Mike Young was still in the room.  I have known Mike for thirty 
years, he can be a difficult person, but he is consistently difficult.  If Mike 
became more difficult, or if he became more intense in his "difficult-ness," 
or if it was more frequent, then I would worry about him.  If this was tied to 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See id. at 12 (suggesting that these behaviors include erratic behavior and angry 
outbursts).  Once these types of behavior are identified, however, the person must alert the 
threat-assessment team, thereby triggering an appropriate response within the pre-designed 
plan.  Id. 
 79. See id. (requiring the threat-assessment team to evaluate the risk level, once 
questionable behaviors are reported to the team). 
 80. See id. ("If the institution is able to help people who are upset, angry, depressed, or 
troubled in some way, many problems can be addressed before they rise to the level of a 
threat."). 
 81. See id. (citing the Virginia Tech shooting as a prime example of failing to report 
abnormal social tendencies).  For example, many individuals, both students and academic 
personnel, raised concerns about the Virginia Tech shooter before the incident.  Id.  These 
concerns, however, were "not routed to one central place where the magnitude and 
seriousness of his problems could be identified."  Id.  The threat-assessment team addresses 
this critique.  Id. 
 82. See Cornell, supra note 77, at 12 (noting that the first step in the "threat 
assessment decision-tree" centers on identifying the threat). 
 83. See id. ("It is essential that all persons in help-providing and supervisory roles in 
the institution . . . understand that all threats must be passed along to the threat assessment 
team."). 
 84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 85. Id. 
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work productivity or other issues, now I have a concern.86  So it is not just 
the behaviors—and that is how we can ferret out some of the academic 
nuttiness—that have changed, it is the increase in intensity and frequency of 
the behaviors.87 
It is important that we are able to report concerns to the threat-
assessment team.88  There have to be numerous access points; you have to 
market that, it has to be open, it has to protect the person bringing forward 
his or her fears or concerns.89  The process has to be understood.90  
Concerns can be brought forward online; there should be many avenues to 
do that.91  The threat-assessment team is one of many strategies used to 
prepare for, respond to, and mitigate threats from a variety of different 
hazards.92  As we see, there is no one-size-fits-all.93  The best that we can 
do is to develop policies, protocols, and tactics to help us respond, in the 
truest sense of response, so if something happens we are prepared for it. 
In closing, I want to note that in terms of resource allocation, an ounce 
of prevention is much better than a ton of response.  Response is too late; it 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Cornell, supra note 77, at 12–13 (differentiating non-threats from threats 
based on intent and intensity). 
 87. See id. (suggesting that threat-assessment teams should evaluate threats on a 
continuum, distinguishing low-level threats from high-level threats). 
 88. See id. at 12 ("The team should be notified anytime someone in the college 
observes or learns about a threat of violence or situation that appears to be threatening."). 
 89. See id. at 14 (placing the onus on the administration to support the team and 
provide clear policies and procedures for team administration, including mechanisms for 
communicating potential threats to the team). 
 90. See id. (discussing the importance of educating the entire institution—students, 
faculty, and staff—on the threat-assessment team’s role).  Such education includes 
instructing all institutional members on how to identify threats and subsequently 
communicate them to the team.  Id. 
 91. Cf. Nicky Hutson & Helen Cowie, Setting Up an Email Peer Support Scheme, 25 
PASTORAL CARE EDUC. 12, 13 (2007) (discussing the implementation of an email support 
system to combat bullying at an all-boys school in England).  The young boys 
communicated via email namely because it permitted them to receive counseling 
anonymously.  Id. 
 92. See Del Stover, Threat Assessment Teams Target School Crisis, 70 EDUC. DIG. 10, 
12 (2005) (discussing that threat-assessment teams are available for analyzing the credibility 
of threats, while law-enforcement officials remain as the primary contact in bomb scares and 
other direct dangers). 
 93. See, e.g., Ken Strong & Dewey Cornell, Student Threat Assessment in Memphis 
City Schools:  A Descriptive Report, 34 BEHAV. DISORDERS 42, 44 (discussing Memphis 
City Schools’ adaption of the threat-assessment team approach, which was tailored to fit the 
schools’ needs and resources).  In Memphis, the city school system adopted a variation of 
the traditional threat-assessment team approach by implementing a trial version through a 
single, centralized facility as opposed to several teams at fixed school sites.  Id. 
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is after the fact.  We spend a great deal of money and time on planning and 
training for our response; and we should, but we need to spend more money 
on prevention and awareness. 
  
